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Abstract: Objective: To discuss the diagnostic validity of unusual bodily perceptions along the 
spectrum from age-specific, often transitory and normal, to pathological phenomena in adolescence to 
hypochondriasis and finally to psychosis. 
Methods: Critical literature review of the cornerstone diagnostic groups along the spectrum embracing 
anxiety and cenesthopathy in adolescence, hypochondriasis, and cenesthopathy and psychosis, 
followed by a discussion of the diagnostic overlaps along this spectrum. 
Results: The review highlights significant overlaps between the diagnostic cornerstones. It is apparent 
that adolescents with unusual bodily perceptions may conceptually qualify for more than one 
diagnostic group along the spectrum. To determine whether cenesthopathies in adolescence mirror 
emerging psychosis, a number of issues need to be considered, i.e. age and mode of onset, gender, level 
of functioning and drug use. The role of overvalued ideas at the border between hypochondriasis and 
psychosis must be considered. 
Conclusion: As unusual bodily symptoms may in some instances meet formal psychosis risk criteria, a 
narrow understanding of these symptoms may lead to both inappropriate application of the new DSM-
5 attenuated psychosis syndrome and of treatment selection. On the other hand, the possibility of a 
psychotic dimension of unusual bodily symptoms in adolescents must always be considered as most 
severe expression of the cenesthopathy spectrum. 
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Dear Editor, 
 
We would like to thank you for giving us the opportunity to resubmit a revised version of the manuscript Ref.No. 
COMPRPSYCHIATRY-D-13-00375. We have carefully studied the recommendations and issues raised by the 
two reviewers and tried to address them adequately.  
 
In the following we would like to address all points raised by the reviewers in more detail: 
 
Answers to comments of Reviewer 1: 
Although the paper contains interesting information including historical annotations on disturbances of the bodily 
self, the focus and method of the study is not very clear. The authors restrict their literature review on topics 
related to anxiety, hypochondriasis, and psychosis, and do not explicate how the literature search was performed. 
Was it a systematic review of  the literature (how many papers reviewed? selection criteria?) or selective? If it 
was selective, why not discuss the concept of somatization, Briquet's syndrome, or somatic delusions?  
 
We would like to thank the reviewer for raising this important point. As we did not follow specific guidelines 
„Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses‟ (PRISMA) guidelines (Moher et al., 
2009), we agree with your comment that this a selective and not systematic review. Therefore, we now removed 
the term “systematic” and clearly state that this is a “critical” review. Furthermore, we have rephrased the 
methods in more detail on page 4, line 21, to page 5, line 9.  
We also acknowledge that including a discussion of somatization is an important aspect. This now features on 
page 9, lines 3 to 19. We did not include a discussion of the Briquet‟s syndrome. This is a specific somatization 
disorder with multiple symptoms, and our above mentioned paragraph includes the general concept of 
somatization, thus also Briquet‟s syndrome. We however now included the concept of somatic delusions in our 
section on “cenesthopathy and psychosis” that we have restructured substantially (see page 12, lines 13 to 24). 
We now also reference somatic delusions on page 16, line 7 (references 52 and 53). 
 
 
The main conclusion of the paper is that there is the risk that the DSM-5 attenuated psychosis syndrome may be 
over-diagnosed given the fact that unusual body experiences seem to be an aspecific feature of several disorders 
not only psychosis. I did not find a solid argument for this conclusion in the discussion. Also could the authors 
offer any suggestions to avoid this problem of overdiagnosis and propose alternate methods of assessment and 
appraisal of distortions of the bodily self that would improve on diagnosis and treatment? 
 
Cover Letter
We now have rephrased the paragraph in the discussion section with regard to the application of DSM-5 and 
provide a clearer rational (see page 18, line 15, to page 19, line 5). However, our paper did not intend to discuss 
any propositions for alternate methods of assessments to improve diagnosis and treatment. The purpose of our 
review is to highlight the vast diagnostic spectrum on which abnormal bodily experiences can occur and thus to 
refer to the caveats if such appraisal of this spectrum is not considered in the assessment of potential psychosis 
at-risk states. 
 
 
The paper is very long and repetitive. The authors should make efforts to shorten it. Also, I am not convinced that 
the three case-vignettes add any value to the paper. The sections on mode of onset, primary or secondary 
cenesthopathy, border of hypochondriasis/psychosis/overvalued ideas, should be shorter and more poignant. 
 
These points are well-taken. We have now omitted all three case vignettes. We also omitted the entire paragraph 
on the discussion whether cenestopathies are primary or secondary. We also shortened the sections on mode of 
onset, border of hypochondriasis/psychosis/overvalued ideas, level of functioning and on gender, rephrased parts 
of it more poignant and omitted any repetitions. The manuscript is now substantially shorter. 
 
 
Answers to comments of Reviewer 2: 
Can authors please describe the methodology applied for this "systematic" literature review in more detail?  
 
We would like to thank the reviewer for raising this important point. Following the comment of Reviewer 1 (see 
above) we have rephrased the methods in more detail on page 4, line 21, to page 5, line 9. Furthermore, we now 
removed the term “systematic” and clearly state that this is a “critical” review. 
 
 
In respect of psychotic prodromal symptoms (one area covered in this review) the literature review does not seem 
to have captured all relevant developments, i.e. some key publications from Parnas and Stanghellini, outlining 
new assessment tools re identification of abnormal bodily sensations prone/closer to developing psychosis: 
(other on cenesthesias and cenesthopathic schizophrenia: Bräuning et al. 2000); Priebe & Röhricht 2002) Parnas 
(2005) re EASE instrument Stanghellini, G. (2009) Embodiment and schizophrenia. World Psychiatry, 8, 56-59. 
Stanghellini et al. (2012) Abnormal bodily experiences may be a marker of early schizophrenia? Current 
pharmaceutical design . 01/2012; 18(4):392-8. 
We acknowledge that an inclusion and discussion of this additional literature is important. We now have 
substantially restructured the section “Cenesthopathy and psychosis” and have extended our discussion of this 
section, including the literature mentioned by the reviewer plus additional references (see page 12, lines 1 to 24; 
references 36 to 43). 
 
 
We would once more like to thank for the thoughtful and detailed reviews that we hope have helped us to improve 
the paper substantially. 
We hope that we have addressed all concerns satisfactorily. 
 
Sincerely 
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Abstract 
Objective: To discuss the diagnostic validity of unusual bodily perceptions along the 
spectrum from age-specific, often transitory and normal, to pathological phenomena 
in adolescence to hypochondriasis and finally to psychosis. 
Methods: Critical literature review of the cornerstone diagnostic groups along the 
spectrum embracing anxiety and cenesthopathy in adolescence, hypochondriasis, 
and cenesthopathy and psychosis, followed by a discussion of the diagnostic 
overlaps along this spectrum. 
Results: The review highlights significant overlaps between the diagnostic 
cornerstones. It is apparent that adolescents with unusual bodily perceptions may 
conceptually qualify for more than one diagnostic group along the spectrum. To 
determine whether cenesthopathies in adolescence mirror emerging psychosis, a 
number of issues need to be considered, i.e. age and mode of onset, gender, level of 
functioning and drug use. The role of overvalued ideas at the border between 
hypochondriasis and psychosis must be considered. 
Conclusion: As unusual bodily symptoms may in some instances meet formal 
psychosis risk criteria, a narrow understanding of these symptoms may lead to both 
inappropriate application of the new DSM-5 attenuated psychosis syndrome and of 
treatment selection. On the other hand, the possibility of a psychotic dimension of 
unusual bodily symptoms in adolescents must always be considered as most severe 
expression of the cenesthopathy spectrum. 
 
Key words: 
adolescent psychology; hallucination of body sensation; hypochondriasis; psychotic 
disorders; nosology 
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the early recognition and intervention of psychotic 
disorders has developed to one of the most vigorously studied fields in psychiatry 
with innumerous mental health services around the globe now providing early 
psychosis programs [1, 2]. As a result, Section III of DSM-5 [3], has implemented the 
„attenuated psychosis syndrome‟ as a new „condition for further study‟, although not 
yet recommended for clinical use. The rising public awareness of both the availability 
of these services and the potential to improve illness outcome via early intervention 
has contributed to a larger diagnostic spectrum being assessed today in early 
psychosis services compared to pioneering days. This phenomenon is reflected by 
findings of significantly higher non-transition rates to psychosis [4] and considerable 
remission rates [5] in more recent studies of patients with psychosis risk states in 
comparison to earlier studies. This observation, however, is not surprising: symptoms 
that formally meet criteria for psychosis risk states may not always necessarily mirror 
an actual increased risk for psychosis, but may occur as epiphenomena of other 
underlying psychiatric disorders. Thus, whilst early psychosis services primarily set 
out to identify patients at risk for psychosis as early as possible in the disease 
course, they now more commonly face the additional task of disentangling genuine 
psychotic risk states from other overlapping psychiatric diagnoses.  
This task is all the more challenging as not only psychosis, but also most other 
mental illnesses begin in adolescence [6]. Furthermore, as adolescence is a period of 
life characterized by multitudinous variants in behaviour, developing diversity of 
contextual thinking, and frequent emotional turmoil, patients that are referred to early 
psychosis services for risk assessment may simply experience symptoms that belong 
to the large scope of phenomena inhering in adolescence. Thus, formal psychosis 
risk symptoms may lie anywhere on the continuous spectrum reaching from 
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prototypal and generally transient adolescent phenomena to epiphenomena of other 
underlying mental disorders to genuine evolving psychosis.  
Undoubtedly, one of the most challenging spectra that warrant accurate 
consideration as to whether adolescents are about to develop psychosis bears on the 
appearance of unusual bodily perceptions. Adolescence is also the life period with 
dramatic physical change and development, leading to a greater awareness of these 
young people of their physical appearance to a greater potential for concern as to 
their personal physical health and well-being.  
In the present review, we discuss the diagnostic validity of unusual bodily perceptions 
in adolescence. As we explore the spectrum embracing age-specific normal 
phenomena to psychosis, we highlight the phenomenology of body related anxiety in 
adolescence, then move further along the spectrum to summarize the characteristics 
of hypochondriasis, to finally reach the “psychotic” end of the spectrum.  
 
Aims of the study 
To discuss the diagnostic validity of unusual bodily perceptions along the spectrum 
from age-specific, often transitory and normal, to pathological phenomena in 
adolescence to hypochondriasis and finally to psychosis. 
   
Material and methods 
We first critically review the terms that are essential to our theme and that refer to 
bodily perceptions. We then provide a literature review of the diagnosis constituting 
the cornerstones along the above-mentioned spectrum, i.e. anxiety and 
cenesthopathy in adolescence, hypochondriasis, and cenesthopathy and psychosis. 
In the final section, we expand our review to discuss the diagnostic overlaps along 
the investigated spectrum.  
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Specifically, electronic searches were performed in the PUBMED database  
by combining the following two sets of keywords: (1) „cenesthesia‟, „cenesthopathy‟, 
„hallucination of body sensation‟, „somatic delusion‟; and (2) „anxiety‟, 
„hypochondriasis‟, „psychosis‟, „psychotic‟, „psychotic disorder‟, „prepsychosis‟, „pre-
psychosis‟, „pre-psychotic‟. 
We reviewed the database and carefully searched the reference lists of the included 
articles identified in the original search. We included all papers published in peer-
reviewed journals until January 2014, without any language restriction though the 
vast majority of papers were in English.  
 
Results 
Cenesthesia and cenesthopathy 
The general awareness of one‟s sense of bodily existence and the general feeling of 
well-being or malaise was coined in 1794, well over two centuries ago, with the term 
cenesthesia in a doctoral thesis of a student of the German psychiatrist and 
physician Johann Christian Reil [7]. Reil‟s discovery had a great impact on the 
development of neuroanatomical knowledge (i.e. the insular cortex) contributing 
significantly to a changed view of the human body and of mental processes [8]. 
Cenesthesia was defined as „the means of which the soul is informed of the state of 
its body, which occurs by means of the nerves generally distributed throughout the 
body‟. The term was equivalent to the German Gemeingefühl or Leibgefühl, for which 
the French equivalent became cénésthésie or sensibilité générale [9]. Cenesthesia 
expresses the general sense of bodily experience and was seen as the integrative 
denominator for Meinhaftigkeit or I-ness. Reil attributed changes in cenesthesia to a 
number of general disorders, but he also described idiopathic disorders of the 
cenesthesia with limitation to the nervous system. He postulated that a distortion sent 
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a misleading message to the brain about the body‟s condition, giving rise to a bodily 
illusion and, subsequently, to an aberrant belief in a dangerous disease.  
It was, however, only a century later that French psychiatrists Dupre and Camus [10] 
introduced the term cenesthopathy for states of disordered cenesthesia, i.e. 
pathological bodily perceptions, and pointed out that cenesthopathies are likely to be 
mistaken for neurasthenic, melancholic or hypochondriacal states. They are 
characterized by prevailing abnormal and often bizarre sensations that usually lead 
to great concern in patients. Dupre [11] later alluded to the large familiarity of 
psychiatrists with cenesthopathy as they commonly see such states in their patients. 
In some analogy to Reil‟s cenesthesia, Wernicke [12] described the concept of 
Somatopsyche and vital feelings, and Jaspers described comparable sensations in 
the section of Awareness of Body in General Psychopathology [13]. While Wernicke 
[12]  associated disruptions of vital feelings more commonly to affective psychoses, 
Jaspers [13] described these phenomena to particularly occur in schizophrenic 
patients, emphasizing Bleuler‟s [14] observation that among the most common and 
important symptoms of schizophrenia are those involving bodily feelings. It was not 
before 1957 that cenesthetic schizophrenia was introduced by Huber as a specific 
type of schizophrenia with characteristic cenesthopathies [15]. Besides German and 
French literature the concept of cenesthopathy has been described in Russian [16] 
and Japanese [17,18] literature, however, its existence is only elusively mentioned in 
English literature and not acknowledged at all in major American textbooks on 
psychiatry [19].  
 
Anxiety and cenesthopathy in adolescence 
In no other period of life do physical changes occur as dramatically as in 
adolescence. These changes come along with a marked increase of adolescents‟ 
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general sense of their bodily existence [20]. Thus, adolescence as a developmental 
„milestone‟ is inevitably and intrinsically tied to the evolving awareness of the 
potential vulnerability of physical integrity and health. While these young individuals 
may grow accustomed to minor incidences such as sporting injuries of the muscular 
or skeletal system or transient infectious diseases long before they reach 
adolescence, and while any subjective symptom experience within the range of such 
circumstances would not be conceived as cenesthopathies, severe health concern 
may emerge in association with unexpected and previously unexperienced 
symptoms, notably of organs that may be attributed with higher fragility or vital 
importance, such as the eyes, the heart, or the brain. In such cases, young 
individuals experience symptoms that affect an entirely ‟new‟ span of organs and that 
are well beyond the range of previously witnessed and thus non-disconcerting 
phenomena. For these, the term cenesthopathic may be more appropriate.  
It is not unusual that the experience of „new‟ bodily perceptions is preceded by a 
sudden episode of intense anxiety. The relationship of the latter with 
depersonalization is well documented in literature [21, 22], occasionally following 
cannabis use [23]. Importantly, one of the symptom dimensions of depersonalization 
disorder that emerged from two recent factor analytical studies was anomalous body 
experience [24] or body distortion [25], respectively. Further, cenesthopathy can co-
occur with depersonalization and feelings of insufficiency to form a „triangle‟ 
symptomatology for which the term adolescent cenesthopathy was proposed [18].  
Adolescent cenestopathy is more common in males than in females [18]. It is 
noteworthy that both patients with depersonalization disorder and adolescent 
cenesthopathy are described as being more anxiety prone, socially insecure and shy 
[18, 21, 22]. These patients may show disturbed narcissistic regulation [22] and tend 
to split their ego into an ego that observes the experiencing ego, a phenomenon that 
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has been named „autoscopy‟ [26], i.e. it is now the patient himself who is under the 
„coverslip of the microscope‟.  
Thus, in summary, following an initial episode of intense anxiety, anxiety prone 
adolescents with disturbed narcissistic regulation may react with a catastrophic 
appraisal of normally transient symptoms, not only of depersonalization, but also of 
bodily experiences, such as accelerated heart beat, blurred vision, or headache [27].  
 
Hypochondriasis 
The essential part of any definition of hypochondriasis is a morbid preoccupation with 
one‟s body or state of health, either mental or physical [28]. Although DSM-IV [29] 
hypochondriasis has been replaced as official diagnosis in DSM-5 by illness anxiety 
disorder, we shall use the term hypochondriasis throughout this review, as the latter 
term has uniformly been used in literature. DSM-IV  [29] defines hypochondriasis as 
„a preoccupation with fears of having, or the idea that one has, a serious disease 
based on a misinterpretation of one or more bodily signs or symptoms‟. Despite vast 
medical evaluation that does not identify any general medical condition that fully 
accounts for the person‟s concerns about disease or for the physical signs or 
symptoms, these patients continue to experience an unwarranted fear or idea of 
having a disease. According to DSM-IV, the belief, however, is not of delusional 
intensity (i.e. the person can acknowledge the possibility that she or she may be 
exaggerating the extent of the feared disease, or that there may be no disease at all), 
but still causes significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning. The preoccupation may be with bodily functions such 
as heartbeat or with vague physical sensations, and these concerns may involve 
several body systems or a specific organ or a single disease, not uncommonly a fear 
of having cardiac disease. Consequently, patients often present their medical history 
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in often meticulous detail, and deterioration of doctor-patient relationships and 
„doctor-shopping‟ are common.  
A common challenge in clinical practice is to differentiate hypochondriasis from 
somatization disorder, as the latter is a common disorder in primary and secondary 
health care [30]. Although both patients with somatization disorder and with 
hypochondriasis fear suffering from a serious disease and thus frequently seek 
medical help, the concern of patients with somatization disorder is more directed 
towards receiving symptom releasing treatment, whereas the main goal of patients 
with hypochondriasis is to having ruled out serious diagnoses. This distinction 
between these two types of disorders was more readily applicable with the DSM-IV 
[29] than with the DSM-5 [3] definitions. In DSM-IV, a pivotal diagnostic criterion of 
somatization disorder was that physical complaints lead to treatment being sought. In 
DSM-5, somatization disorder has been reconceptualised as somatic symptom 
disorder with the treatment-seeking behaviour being dropped, however now including 
“a persistently high level of anxiety about symptoms” as one of the main diagnostic 
hallmarks. Thus, as DSM-IV hypochondriasis has been reformulated as illness 
anxiety disorder in DSM-5, the differentiation between somatization and 
hypochondriasis remains a challenging task when relying on the current DSM 
definitions.  
DSM-IV [29] provides a specifier for hypochondriasis which is used if, for most of the 
time during the current episode, the individual does not recognize that the concern 
about having a serious illness is excessive or unreasonable. DSM-5 also provides a 
specifier, distinguishing between frequently versus rarely used medical care [3]. In 
general, hypochondriasis carries a poor prognosis, the duration usually being 
measured in decades rather than years, and the response to treatments is uniformly 
unsatisfactory [28]. The disorder neither remits spontaneously nor progresses to 
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further delusional elaboration. Although the disorder can begin at any age, its most 
common age at onset allegedly is in early adulthood, with male and lower social 
classes being more prone than others [28]. As in adolescent cenesthopathy, there 
seems to be a predominance of shy and sensitive individuals with disturbed 
narcissistic regulation among hypochondriac individuals [28].  
The prevalence of hypochondriasis in primary care settings has varied from 4% to 
9% [29]. However, there may be a tendency to underestimate the prevalence of 
hypochondriasis in the general population, due to the relative isolation of many 
sufferers and the tendency to self-medicate. Indeed, many of these patients come to 
the attention of the psychiatric services only by referral from colleagues on other 
specialities [31]. 
 
Cenesthopathy and psychosis 
Observing a high similarity with the cases previously described by Dupre and Camus 
[10], Huber [15] was the first to describe patients with cenesthetic schizophrenia as a 
subtype of schizophrenia that was characterized by peculiar disturbances of bodily 
perceptions, but remained often unidentified as psychotic disorder due to its 
hypochondriacal characteristic. Cenesthetic schizophrenia has never been 
incorporated in DSM, while it appears undefined in ICD10 [32] among „other 
schizophrenia‟ without having been identified in previous editions. In contrast to 
Anglo-American literature, a rich body of publications on cenesthopathic forms of 
schizophrenia exists in Russian and Japanese psychiatry [16, 17, 18]. Huber [15] 
described several cenesthetic symptoms (Prägnanztypen), e.g. sensations of 
numbness, wandering sensations within the body, electrifying and thermic 
sensations, or sensations of movement, which are published in the Bonn Scale for 
the Assessment of Basic Symptoms (BSABS) [34]. Klosterkötter et al. [35] used the 
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BSABS [34] several decades later to study the power of cenesthopathies to predict 
schizophrenia, however, none of the BSABS cenestopathies featured among the ten 
basic symptoms reported to determine prediction. Huber [15] differentiated three 
„developmental levels‟ of disease with progression from uncharacteristic 
hypochondriacal symptoms to qualitatively bizarre cenesthesias and finally to typical 
schizophrenic symptoms such as first rank Schneiderian symptoms, i.e. somatic 
passivity phenomena/bodily hallucinations, with schizophrenia diagnosis only 
permitted if the third level is reached. The individual patient can experience transition 
from the first to second and to third level and back to first level again. 
Uncharacteristic hypochondriac first level symptoms can prevail initially and during 
the later course of illness. Thus, cenesthetic schizophrenia can often only be 
diagnosed after substantial longitudinal observation, as cenesthopathies precede the 
onset of first psychotic episode of cenesthetic schizophrenia by several years, and as 
in comparison to other schizophrenia subtypes, the prodromal phase preceding 
psychosis onset is particularly long [33,36]. Given the particularities of the disease 
course, Huber suggested that this was a type of schizophrenia that comes to a 
standstill at its beginning or develops into pure residual syndromes after one or a few 
short psychotic episodes, and he thus claimed a close resemblance to Bleuler‟s 
latent schizophrenia [14]. However, Huber observed an acute onset of in about one 
quarter of his patient sample with cenesthetic schizophrenia, characterised by 
dysesthetic crises with vegetative symptoms and an elementary fear of dying [33].  
In cenesthetic schizophrenia proposed by Huber [15], the classic schizophrenia 
symptoms are limited to psychotic exacerbations, while the entire disease course is 
characterized by these abnormal bodily sensations that generally occur in rapid 
changes in paroxysms and commonly co-occur with vital discomfort, fatigue and 
exhaustion. However, Huber [15] recognized that cenesthetic disturbances also 
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occurred in a large percentage (64%) of other schizophrenia subtypes. Already 
French psychopathologists in the early 20th century thought that hebephrenia was 
characterized by impaired nervous systems moderating cenesthesia [37]. 
Phenomenologically, the essential feature of schizophrenic existence is 
disembodiment, i.e. an increasing disruption between subjectivity and bodily 
experience where the schizophrenic person behaves like a soulless body, leading to 
initially normal cenestheasias being lived in hyperreflexive awareness and diminished 
self-awareness [37]. In studies using a scale for the phenomenological Examination 
of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) [38] that include cenesthetic experiences 
overlapping with Huber‟s cenesthopathies, self-disorders were more prevalent in 
adolescents meeting at-risk criteria for psychosis than in their non-psychotic help-
seeking peers [39] and aggregated selectively in the schizophrenia spectrum [40]; 
however, prevalence of cenesthetic experiences was not reported specifically. The 
phenomenological view warrants that abnormal bodily experiences should be 
included as diagnostic hallmarks for schizophrenia [37]. Support stems from more 
recent studies that have demonstrated considerable prevalence rates of abnormal 
bodily experiences in the early onset of schizophrenia [17,41,42]. These findings 
underline that cenesthopathies are not restricted to Huber‟s cenesthetic 
schizophrenia where they generally emerge after many years. Further, the studies by 
Röhricht & Priebe [41] and by Stanghellini et al. [42] show a significant relation 
between cenesthopathies and disturbances of body concept, suggesting that 
cenesthopathic phenomena may be classified as delusional perception rather than 
perceptual aberration, i.e. misinterpretation of internal perception, and thus 
supporting the concept of somatic delusions [43].  
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An appraisal of diagnostic overlaps along the anxiety-hypochondriasis-
psychosis spectrum 
The comprehension and diagnostic validity of unusual and unexpected bodily 
perceptions in adolescence is a major challenge. Provided that any organic and/or 
substance induced aetiologies can be precluded, such symptoms warrant a thorough 
appraisal of a broad spectrum of overlapping disorders. Patients may fall neatly into 
established categories, while others remain enigmatic and present disease pictures 
that are fluid at the edges, flowing together easily with other diagnoses. When 
adolescents experience cenesthopathies, both a number of diagnostic and 
phenomenological particularities and commonalities can thus be distinguished. Latter 
need specific consideration to determine whether cenesthopathies in adolescence 
mirror emerging psychosis.  
 
Mode of onset 
Unusual and unexpected bodily perceptions may follow sudden episodes of anxiety. 
In some instances, e.g. following cannabis use, unexpected bodily perceptions may 
instantly precede and thus cause sudden anxiety. In both scenarios, the onset is 
acute, and any persisting bodily perceptions may be attributed to an underlying 
anxiety disorder, while it is debatable if in these cases bodily symptoms may be 
considered as cenesthopathies in a more narrow sense. Acute onset may occur in 
hypochondriasis, too, and then is a favourable prognostic indicator. 
Thus, at a first glance, it would seem an easy task to exclude a psychotic dimension 
in the phenomenology of these acute onset symptoms. However, even if cenesthetic 
schizophrenia are described to develop progressively along an extended prodromal 
period, Huber noted that in one quarter of all cases, psychosis onset was acute and 
occurred as dysesthetic crises [15, 33]. Further, up to 70% of patients that develop 
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schizophrenia report to have experienced episodic or sustained symptoms of anxiety 
during the prodromal phases [44].  
 
The border between hypochondriasis and psychosis and the role of overvalued ideas 
Huber emphasized that the qualitatively peculiar disturbances of bodily perceptions, 
and not a delusional hypochondriasis, are the central and primary symptom formation 
in cenesthethic schizophrenia. This discriminator may facilitate distinguishing 
between hypochondriasis and cenesthopathic schizophrenia as defined by Huber 
[15]. However, Huber [33] underlined the frequent difficulty in distinguishing 
cenesthetic schizophrenia from hypochondriasis. Other authors emphasized since 
long that the variety of peculiar somatic sensation in psychosis had often been 
described under the umbrella term hypochondriasis [45], and Reil [7] was aware that 
not in all instances patients with cenesthopathies could correct their false impression. 
Indeed, in clinical practice, patients may be occupied by their bodily perceptions and 
be convinced about their reality to the extent that the conceptual distinction between 
a hypochondriac and a psychotic disorder becomes an immense challenge, reaching 
far beyond the distinction between hypochondriasis and the cenesthopathic 
schizophrenia type of psychosis.  
The distinction between a hypochondriac and psychotic dimension in cenesthopathic 
phenomena cannot be discussed without a particular appraisal of the overvalued 
ideas, a concept that was established by Wernicke [12] corresponding to the French 
concept of „idée fixe‟, but that is only referred to in sparse amount in British textbooks 
and is widely ignored in American psychiatry [46]. Wernicke noted that overvalued 
ideas appeared in a variety of clinical settings and are difficult to reconcile with the 
usual aetiological divisions in psychiatry. In Appendix C of DSM-IV [29] as well as in 
Appendix on „Glossary of Technical Terms‟ of DSM-5 [3], an overvalued idea is 
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described as an unreasonable and sustained belief that is maintained with less than 
delusional intensity (i.e. the person is able to acknowledge the possibility that the 
belief may not be true). The available literature [12,13,46] summarizes overvalued 
ideas by following features: they are held strongly, but with less than delusional 
intensity; they usually preoccupy the individual‟s mental life; compared to most 
obsessions, they are ego-syntonic; their content is usually regarded as abnormal 
compared to the general population, but not bizarre as some delusions; they cause 
disturbed functioning or distress to the patient and others; and compared to many 
delusions, they are more likely to lead to repeated action which is considered as 
justified. The overvalued idea thus describes an isolated, preoccupying belief, neither 
delusional nor obsessional in nature, which comes to dominate the sufferer‟s life, 
often indefinitely.  
Importantly, literature refers to hypochondriasis as prototypical disorder featuring 
overvalued ideas [12,47]. If hypochondriasis is the prototype for a disorder with 
overvalued ideas, then – following above summarized definitions - we would expect 
hypochondriac patients to be able to maintain the facility to put into question their 
belief to some extent. However, in clinical practice, not few hypochondriac patients 
maintain a strong conviction as to the reality of their bodily experiences. Accordingly, 
DSM-IV [29] - but not DSM-5 [3] - provides a specifier differentiating those patients 
with poor insight from those with good insight. It is this strongly held conviction that 
stands at the origin of the determined and repeated action and the high degree of 
affect that are further core characteristics of the definitions of both overvalued ideas 
and hypochondriasis. The criterion referring to a less than delusional intensity in 
maintaining a belief is thus of limited value in numerous cases.  
In summary, the distinction between hypochondriac and psychotic quality in bodily 
perceptions is an ambitious diagnostic task. Numerous terms have thus been 
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proposed for the hypochondriasis-psychosis overlap. These include progressive 
somatopsychosis [48], hypochondriacal hebephrenia [49], hypochondriac 
paraphrenia [50], or hypochondriacal psychosis [51]. In schizophrenia, it is not 
unusual for bodily complaints to be considered first as simple hypochondriacal 
complaints, only to be later assessed as cenesthopathic disturbances, particularly 
when the bodily complaints consist of bizarre or delusional alterations in bodily 
perceptions [28,43,52,53]. Bleuler may have been the first to emphasize the clinical 
importance of bodily complaints among schizophrenics. He stated that the majority of 
(treatment-resistent) hypochondriacs are schizophrenics [14]. Interestingly, he 
suggested that idiopathic hypochondrosiasis is essentially masked schizophrenia or 
schizophrenia which stagnated at the initial stage of the disease process [54].  
 
Level of functioning 
It is of pivotal importance to emphasize that all diagnostic entities that are here 
discussed along the anxiety-induced cenesthopathy-hypochondriasis-psychosis 
spectrum are in most cases characterized by significant impairment in functioning. 
Anxiety-induced cenesthopathy can lead to adolescents suffering considerable social 
and vocational disintegration [23]. Similarly, hypochondriasis is commonly associated 
with a high degree of affect that impact negatively on social and vocational 
functioning [28]. Impaired functioning has been described both in adolescent 
cenesthopathy [18] as well as in the majority of cenesthetic schizophrenia [15, 33]. 
Glatzel & Huber [55] have described an endogenous juvenile-asthenic malfunctioning 
syndrome which is associated with three symptom groups, i.e. cenesthopathy, 
depersonalization symptoms, and disturbed thought or cognition, and often evolves 
before the age of 20 years. The authors pointed to the similarities with low-symptom 
schizophrenia and chronic prodromal states of schizophrenia. It is interesting here to 
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note that criteria for prodromal states of schizophrenia were listed in DSM-III-R [56], 
but due to concerns such as whether these criteria give a valid description of the 
initial prodromal period were dropped from the DSM-IV [29]; however, in DSM-IV, the 
very same criteria were listed for schizotypal disorder, a diagnosis for which ICD-10  
[32] allows an interchangeable use of the term latent schizophrenia. Latter term, as 
already mentioned, was introduced by Bleuler [14] and was considered by Huber [15] 
to show close resemblance to cenesthetic schizophrenia.  
This overview of similar and almost interchangeable concepts mirrors the often 
enigmatic task to disentangle psychotic from non-psychotic processes; a task that is 
all the more challenged by the finding that impaired level of both social and 
vocational functioning is one of the earliest phenomena in evolving psychosis [44]. 
 
Gender 
There is some evidence that female adolescents‟ self-esteem depends on their bodily 
appearance [57], while physical performance is more relevant to self-esteem in male 
adolescents [58]. Also female adolescents are earlier exposed and grow more readily 
accustomed to more dramatic physical and physiological changes such as the 
menarche [57]. Such findings compare favourably to a higher prevalence of male 
gender in adolescent cenesthopathy [18], in hypochondriasis [28], in cenesthopathic 
schizophrenia [33], as well as in the endogenous juvenile-asthenic malfunctioning 
syndrome [55], while male preponderance is not found in body dysmorphophobic 
disorder [59].  
 
Discussion 
Minor degrees of health concern are a common phenomenon throughout the entire 
lifespan. However, they may, spontaneously or in the presence of real disease, 
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become exaggerated in some individuals. Such individuals become over-concerned 
with their health and are convinced that they are seriously ill, noticing various 
abnormal perceptions and recompose these in elaborate schemes that are 
incomprehensive to anyone else. Such patients not infrequently present as 
diagnostic conundrums. As shown in our review, they may bring into question the 
possibility of mixed and overlapping illness states. Although this approach is at odds 
with the traditional concept of classifying mental health disorders into single 
categories, our review provides a prototypical example that some symptoms may not 
be assigned to one specific diagnostic category, but instead tap a number of 
diagnostic categories that overlap in terms of symptoms and thus must be 
considered against the background of this spectrum [60]. This is the case specifically 
in adolescents who commonly present phenomena that theoretically not only span a 
large diagnostic spectrum, but often lie on a continuum from normal adolescent to 
actual pathological states, including attenuated or established psychosis.  
A constricted understanding of these symptoms may lead to diagnosing psychosis 
risk and indicate treatment that may fall wide off the mark, and instead of conferring 
symptom relief may increase risk of stigmatizing these young individuals. Over the 
past two decades and in innumerous mental health services around the world [1], the 
potential at-risk state for psychosis has been assessed with psychometric scales in 
help-seeking individuals [2]. Findings using these psychometric scales have provided 
the basis for the definition of the new DSM-5 attenuated psychosis syndrome [3]. As 
shown in our review, cenesthesias may occur as phenotypical expression of 
emerging psychosis, as it also may mirror a vast array of other underlying mental 
states and disorders. Thus, a purely psychometric approach to understand the origin 
of cenesthopathies or abnormal bodily sensations is likely to be a restrictive 
approach. Even though DSM-5 underlines that the attenuated psychosis syndrome is 
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not for clinical use, individuals may thus more promptly be assigned to this single 
diagnostic category. These potential caveats need to be considered in any 
assessment of potential psychosis risk symptoms. On the other hand, the possibility 
of a psychotic dimension of unusual bodily perceptions in adolescents must always 
be considered as most severe expression of cenesthopathy.  
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